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Only 37 per cent of young people voted at the 2005 British General Election, seemingly
confirming the oft-cited view that this generation is becoming increasingly disconnected
from the political process. Results from a nationwide survey, however, indicate that
their withdrawal from formal politics is more a result of their scepticism of the way
the political system operates, than apathy. Furthermore, they are diverse in their political
(dis)engagement. Results from an examination of the relative effects of socio-economic
location and social capital are inconclusive, although the data indicate that government
social policy aimed at mobilising social capital and addressing socio-economic issues may
increase civic engagement.
Soc ia l Cap i ta l and Po l i t i ca l Engagement
Social capital is a contested concept, with many different approaches to how it is defined
and how it is measured (Coleman, 1988; Halpern, 1999; Hall, 1999; Putnam, 2000).
However, most observers would agree that at its broadest, social capital refers to the
social networks between individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities
that underpin and in turn arise from such connections (Putnam, 2000).
The existence or not of social capital is considered to have implications for political
life and the general health of democracies. According to Putnam (1993), successful and
efficient democratic systems are most likely to be found in tolerant and cooperative societ-
ies displaying high levels of associational life and trust amongst their citizens; by contrast,
governments in societies relatively lacking in social capital are likely to demonstrate
greater inefficiency and corruption. Thus, it can be argued that where people feel isolated
and alienated from social networks and wider society, this will impact negatively on their
levels of trust in others and in political processes, institutions and representatives – poten-
tially leading to a breakdown in civic engagement (Newton, 1999a; Foley and Edwards,
1996).1 In such contexts, people’s withdrawal from formal political life may be observed
both in terms of their decline in support for, and membership of, political organisations
(including parties), and of their abstention from voting in elections (Henn et al., 2005).
Conversely, where people feel relatively high degrees of trust in others and have
integrated links within communities through membership of local associational groups,
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a virtuous circle may develop; a more positive pre-disposition toward political processes
and institutions leads individuals to have a greater confidence in the efficacy of political
participation (Hall, 1999). Consequently, it has been argued that where social capital can
be shaped, developed and mobilised by social policy, this may have positive outcomes
both in terms of civic engagement and better government (Hall, 1999; Halpern, 1999;
Newton, 1999b). As Lowndes and Wilson (2001: 636) contest:
In addition to shaping the context within which established associations flourish or decline,
the institutional design of local governance may influence prospects for the formation of new
groups and new stocks of social capital. By providing opportunities for participation, local
agencies can influence citizens’ appetites for, and competence in, civic activity.
Youth and po l i t i ca l (d i s )engagement in Br i ta in
However, the evidence in contemporary Britain would seem to indicate that a rift is de-
veloping between government and citizens, with people seemingly withdrawing from the
democratic process. This is particularly apparent in terms of declining voter turnout rates
which are a major issue across the generations in Britain (Electoral Commission, 2005a;
Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society, 2006; Power Inquiry, 2006). For instance,
at the 1997 General Election, 71 per cent of voters took to the polls, but by the following
contest in 2001, turnout had slumped to its lowest level since 1918 – to only 59 per cent of
the eligible electorate (Whiteley et al., 2001). Even with the introduction of postal voting
in 2005, the polling rate increased by only 2 per cent (Electoral Commission, 2005a).
This political disconnection amongst British citizens is particularly acute amongst
young people, and patterns of political behaviour and civic engagement amongst this
age group have recently attracted much attention, largely because of their increasing
abstention in elections (Russell et al., 2002; O’Toole et al., 2003; Phelps, 2005). Turnout
in elections is much lower for this youth generation than it is for older members of the
electorate. Compared with the rates reported above, only 39 per cent of eligible 18 to
24 year olds voted at the 2001 General Election (reduced from 68 per cent in 1997),
falling further to only 37 per cent in 2005. In support of this generational turnout gap,
Franklin (2004) has conducted an extensive international analysis of electoral trends and
concluded that age in Britain as in many other countries is a significant predictor of
turnout. Indeed, he claims that the extension of the vote to younger adults which took
place in several countries after the mid-1960s came with a cost which typically depressed
electoral turnout rates.
Furthermore, many academic studies conclude that young people have comparatively
lower-levels of political knowledge than their older contemporaries (Park, 2000; O’Toole
et al., 2003), and have a distinct lack of interest in (formal) politics (Heath and Park,
1997). Compared with older adults, they are less likely to be politically active (The
Electoral Commission and The Hansard Society, 2006), display comparatively weaker
commitments to political parties (Parry et al., 1992), and are less likely to be members of
such organisations (Cole, 1997). Indeed, themessage frommany such studies is that young
people’s levels of political participation in general are in decline, and at a somewhat more
rapid rate than is the case for older adults and previous youth cohorts (Pirie andWorcester,
1998 and 2000; Russell et al., 2002). Moreover, young people can be differentiated from
wider society in terms of their political views – they are considered to be less conservative
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than older contemporaries, highly disillusioned with the operation of politics, and more
sceptical of politicians (Wring, Henn and Weinstein, 1999).
As a consequence, there is a concern amongst politicians and officials that this age
group have a disaffection from politics that is deeply entrenched, and that in the medium
to long term, the more civic-oriented older generations will be replaced by this younger
sceptical generation, threatening the legitimacy of the political system itself (Jowell and
Park, 1998; Phelps, 2004; Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society, 2006).
A number of recent studies have challenged the predominant political apathy thesis,
arguing instead that young people are interested in political matters, and do take part in
differing forms of political action (White et al., 2000; Norris, 2003; O’Toole et al., 2003;
Henn and Weinstein, 2006). Nonetheless, the central preoccupation with young people’s
falling election turnout rates persists, as do concerns therefore about their decoupling
from the British democratic process.2
Unders tand ing po l i t i ca l (d i s )engagement in Br i ta in
Conventional explanations of political participation have tended to focus upon people’s
socio-economic characteristics, such as their social class, gender, ethnicity, and
educational attainment (Verba and Nie, 1972; Parry et al., 1992). Recently, a report
published by The Electoral Commission (2005b) has identified a link between social
exclusion and both political participation and electoral participation. Nonetheless, results
from other studies indicate that these factors have diminishing influence upon people’s
political behaviour (see for instance, Leighley, 1995, and Pattie et al., 2004). The linked
civic voluntarism model tends to stress the importance of resources that individual’s
have at their disposal, including the time, money, and the opportunities that they have
to participate in politics – resources that may be structured by their socio-economic
background (Verba et al., 1995).
By way of contrast, social capital is a relatively under-explored potential driver of
political participation in Britain, although recently several studies have been published
which reveal a positive relationship between social capital variables and civic engagement
(Hall, 1999; Pattie et al., 2003; Fahmy, 2004). While Putnam (1995, 2000) has argued that
social capital is on the decline in the United States, the situation is somewhat different
in Britain. Hall claims that although there is less research in the area, such evidence as
exists indicates that ‘aggregate levels of social capital have not declined to an appreciable
extent in Britain over the post-War years’ (Hall, 1999, p. 457). Moreover, in their book,
Citizenship in Britain, Pattie et al. claim that the relationship between social capital and
both election turnout and civic attitudes is significant (2004).3
In this article, we intend to examine and compare the relative importance of
young people’s socio-economic characteristics with their social capital in order to
account for patterns in their political and civic engagement.4 Whilst social capital is
often characterised as a potential panacea for this declining political participation and
deepening political distrust, the link between the two remains relatively under-explored
as far as the study of young people is concerned. Consequently, research into this area is
important for the future health of British democracy, as this relatively disconnected age
group take the place of older, more engaged citizens; if social capital is found to increase
young people’s political engagement, then government can contribute to democratic
well-being by initiating appropriate social policies for enhancing social capital.
469
Matt Henn et al.
Research des ign
This study is based on a nationwide survey of attainers – young people who have just
been entered on the electoral register and who are therefore eligible to vote in an election
for the first time. Conducted in 2002, this is the first large-scale study to focus exclusively
on this group.
In this article we perform disaggregated analyses of this group in order to examine
whether there are any notable differences between youth sub-groups in terms of their
political attitudes. This stands in contrast to the traditional focus on young people’s
engagement with the political process, where youth have been marginalised or ‘hidden’
in mainstream social science research, often being subsumed into a homogeneous and
undifferentiated group.5 In particular, we are interested in the following questions:
(a) whether or not young people are politically disconnected, and, if so, what is the
source of this – political apathy or political scepticism?; (b) whether or not there are any
identifiable differences in terms of young people’s general levels of satisfaction with British
democracy; (c) whether or not young people feel that there are opportunities open to
them to meaningfully participate within, and influence, the political process; (d) whether
or not there is any variation in their enthusiasm for (or scepticism of) the political set-up;
(e) and if such variations exist across different youth sub-groups, what are their sources –
are socio-economic factors and social capital important drivers of young people’s political
(dis)engagement in Britain? These are important questions, the answers to which will help
to increase our understanding of the dynamics of youth political attitudes in Britain – of a
group that is subject to much criticism for its (alleged) high levels of political apathy and
disinterest, but relatively little systematic empirical investigation.
Data co l l ec t i on m e thods
We used a random sampling method for our study, with respondents drawn from the
electoral register.6 The sample was stratified by Government Standard Region, and
within that by ACORN,7 securing a geographically and socio-economically representative
sample. Respondents were mailed a questionnaire direct to their home addresses during
early 2002, with 705 returns from 3109 sent out – resulting in a final response rate of
23 per cent, which represents a satisfactory return for a postal survey of this nature.
Whilst a higher response rate would have been preferred, the important issue in terms of
representativeness is not the proportion of non-respondents, but the degree to which the
survey respondents are a reflection of the wider youth population (Oppenheim, 1992:
102). With this in mind, we then weighted data to take account of the distribution of
the British youth population across the key variables of region (and nationality), gender,
social class, and ethnicity. Tests confirmed that there was a high degree of match between
the weighted and unweighted data, indicating that our survey results have high external
validity and generalisability.8
M e t h o d s o f an a l y s i s
In order to examine differences in political orientation amongst different youth sub-groups
and the overall impact of key variables on young people’s political attitudes, multivariate
logistic regression has been used. Two sets of predictor (independent) variables were
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deployed for this purpose. The first were socio-economic in nature, including ethnicity,
gender, social class, and education (qualifications held, and whether respondents
remained in full-time education).9 These variables have been selected because previous
studies indicate that they are associated with political attitudes and levels of political
participation,10 and we wanted to test the usefulness of this traditional social science
approach in assessing young people’s orientation to politics. The second set of predictor
variables were designed to measure the impact of social capital on young people’s
political engagement. Social capital is measured using two indexes. The first comprises
respondents’ trust in other people.11 The second index is based on their associational
membership (participation in local voluntary activity and community groups).12
Resu l ts
So how can we best understand the dynamics of youth political orientation in Britain–by
reference to key socio-economic variables (the conventional social science approach),
or by an examination of the two social capital-based variables? In order to address
this question, we conducted a series of direct binary logistic regressions in which the
dependent variables mentioned earlier13 were tested against (i) the five socio-economic
predictors, and (ii) the two social capital variables (trust and associational membership).14
Table 1 presents the results derived from these analyses.
Po l i t i c a l engagemen t
Far from being uniformly apolitical and apathetic, a substantial proportion of young people
stated that they had an interest in ‘Politics’ (56 per cent), and nearly half (48 per cent)
claimed an interest in the 2001 General Election held a year before our study. By combin-
ing the data from these and a number of similar questions answered in our survey, we were
able to derive a ‘political interest’ variable which we tested against the socio-economic
variables outlined above. Table 1 reveals evidence of a statistically significant gender gap,
with men over twice as likely as women to profess an interest in politics (Exp(β) value
of 2.05). Social class also exerted a statistically significant influence–young people from
middle-class managerial/professional households were significantly more interested in
politics than those from manual, unskilled or working-class households (Exp(β) 1.818).
Educational history is not an especially strong driver of political interest, however.
Those who had chosen to prolong full-time study were more interested in political affairs
than those who had left full-time study at the statutory school leaving age, but the
difference is not a significant one; whether or not young people hold educational or
work-related qualifications has no appreciable effect. Ethnicity is an interesting case. The
Exp(β) value is relatively high (1.974), indicating that young people from black minority
ethnic (BME) groups are almost twice as likely to be interested in Politics than are white
youth. However, the β value indicates that this difference is not statistically significant.
This may be partly due to the uneven distribution of cases within this variable, and the
relatively small size of the BME group (33 respondents, representing 4.7 per cent of the
full sample).
Just as the impact of socio-economic background on young people’s political interest
is mixed, so also appears to be the effect of social capital. Those with social trust in others
were nearly one and a half times more likely to claim an interest in politics than were
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Table 1 Logistic regression models of socio-economic and social capital variables as
predictors of political attitudes
β Wald Exp(β)
Interest
Sex (Being male) 0.718∗ 5.686 2.050
Ethnicity (Being non-white) 0.680 0.745 1.974
Qualifications (Having no qualifications) 0.118 0.024 1.125
In education (Staying in education) 0.383 1.388 1.467
Social class (Being managerial/professional) 0.598∗ 4.106 1.818
Social capital – Trust (Having trust) 0.382 1.448 1.465
Social capital – Associational membership (volunteered) 0.973 2.563 2.645
Nagelkerke R2 0.126
Democracy
Sex (Being male) 0.576 3.349 1.778
Ethnicity (Being white) 0.198 0.046 1.219
Qualifications (Having no qualifications) 0.386 0.216 1.471
In education (Staying in education) 0.870∗ 5.553 2.387
Social class (Being managerial/professional) 0.671∗ 4.542 1.957
Social capital – Trust (Having trust) 0.467 2.045 1.595
Social capital – Associational membership (volunteered) 0.261 0.177 1.299
Nagelkerke R2 0.135
Efficacy
Sex (Being male) 0.640 1.813 1.859
Ethnicity (Being non-white) 0.130 0.013 1.139
Qualifications (Having no qualifications) 1.842∗ 5.016 6.307
In education (Staying in education) 0.575 0.905 1.777
Social class (Being managerial/professional) 0.472 0.924 1.604
Social capital – Trust (Having trust) 0.150 0.088 1.162
Social capital – Associational membership (not volunteered) 0.620 0.552 1.859
Nagelkerke R2 0.086
Party
Sex (Being male) 0.164 0.124 1.179
Ethnicity (Being white) 0.084 0.005 1.088
Qualifications (Having no qualifications) 0.953 1.061 2.595
In education (Staying in education) 1.042 2.602 2.835
Social class (Being managerial/professional) 0.807 2.636 2.242
Social capital – Trust (Having trust) 1.129∗ 5.726 3.092
Social capital – Associational membership (volunteered) 0.409 0.134 1.506
Nagelkerke R2 0.164
Notes: Some variables (e.g., ethnicity and associational membership) have been recoded in the
opposite direction in some of the analyses to make interpretation of findings more coherent as it is
well recognised that negative Exp(β)s are more difficult to interpret size of effect. The direction of
the coding is, however, made explicit in the table.
∗p< 05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001.
those lacking such trust (Exp(β) 1.465). Similarly, marked differences in political interest
appear to exist between those with some associational membership whowere nearly three
times more politically engaged than those not volunteering for such activity. Despite the
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high Exp(β) (2.645), the impact is not statistically significant for this variable–possibly
as a consequence of the under-weighted category for those reporting no associational
membership (only 22 respondents, representing 3.1 per cent of the full sample).
Overall, these results seem to run counter to popular thinking that young people
are inherently dismissive of ‘Politics’. British youth do profess an interest in the world of
political affairs. However there are some important differences across youth sub-groups
in this respect, although the results are somewhat mixed for both socio-economic and
social capital effects.
Suppo r t f o r t he democ ra t i c p rocess
Despite the concerns of many politicians, policy-makers, journalists and academics about
young people’s apparent disregard for politics, this generation does appear to have support
for the democratic process. The data from our survey reveal that more people said they
were satisfied (31 per cent) than were dissatisfied (26 per cent) with the way democracy
works (although 28 per cent held a non-committal ‘Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied’
view, suggesting that in combination with the detractors the majority of attainers were
dissatisfied or ambivalent about the democratic process). However, there were some
important distinctions in views held between different youth groups. Those remaining
in full-time education, and those from middle-class households all displayed higher
than expected support for the notion of democracy in Britain; by contrast those young
people who had left the educational system, and those from predominantly working-
class households were less enthusiastic about British democracy. The effect of these two
socio-economic variables is statistically significant (with Exp(β) values of 2.387 and 1.957
respectively). Gender and ethnicity display less of an impact on young people’s attitudes
to the democratic process, although men and white youth were more likely to express
support than were women or those from BME groups. Interestingly, and perhaps contrary
to expectations, the data indicate that those not in possession of educational qualifications
seem to be more interested in politics than their more qualified counterparts, although
the difference is also not a significant one.
The impact of the two social capital variables on young people’s political outlook
is relatively marginal. Whether or not young people participated in voluntary or local
community groups seemed to have little influence over their satisfaction with the state of
democracy in Britain – those engaging in such activity held similar views to the ‘inactives’.
Social trust seems to exert a greater effect than does associational membership (Exp(β)
value 1.595 compared to 1.299), but this is not statistically significant.
Po l i t i c a l e f ficacy
By combining five different questions from our survey we created an external efficacy
index. The data indicate that young people had low feelings of political efficacy – an
overwhelmingly large majority considered themselves to be uniformly marginalised from
the political process, and relatively powerless to influence it (89 per cent). There were
no significant observable differences according to respondents’ ethnicity, their social
class or whether or not they have remained in full-time education. As was the case
with the Democracy variable reported in the previous section, those not in possession of
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educational or work-related qualifications seem to be more politically engaged than their
more qualified contemporaries; they are significantly more likely to feel that they have
some influence over the political decision-making world, by a margin of more than six
to one (Exp(β) 6.307). This would seem to contradict previous academic studies which
suggest a positive relationship between educational attainment and political efficacy (e.g.,
Parry et al., 1992).
Neither of the two social capital variables has a significant influence on feelings of
external efficacy. At most, there are only small to moderate effects observed in the data.
Furthermore, the effects of these two social capital indexes are not uniform. Trust in other
people exerts less of an impact on young people’s feelings of political efficacy (Exp(β)
1.162) than does their participation in local voluntary or community groups. Interestingly,
and contrary to expectations to be inferred from the social capital literature, inactive
youth appear to be almost twice as optimistic as are their active counterparts (Exp(β)
1.859). However, the difference observed for this associational membership variable is
not statistically significant.
Percep t i on o f po l i t i c a l pa r t i e s and p ro fess i ona l po l i t i c i ans
Finally, we examined young people’s attitudes towards the political parties and
professional politicians. A summary variable was developed for this purpose, and the
data indicate that all of the youth groups in the study had a deeply negative view of these
political players. There was no evidence of any gender gap or of any notable difference
in views according to young people’s ethnicity. In contrast, social class would appear to
be quite an important driver of political trust, with those young people from middle-class
households reporting much less scepticism than their manual, unskilled or working-class
counterparts (Exp(β) 2.242). Again, educational career seems to have a contradictory
effect. Those remaining in full-time education demonstrated less aversion to the political
parties than did those no longer in education (Exp(β) 2.835). However, once again
educational attainment seems to display an effect that is contradictory to what we might
expect from the literature on political engagement; those with no qualifications were less
critical of these political players than more qualified youth (Exp(β) 2.595). Despite some
of the differences reported amongst youth sub-groups, for each of the socio-economic
variables examined, all groups were overwhelmingly critical of professional politicians
and the political parties; any differences observed were not statistically significant.
Interestingly those young people with high levels of social capital also held a deep
dislike of formal professional politics. Those active in local voluntary and community
groups were less hostile than were those with no such experience, although the difference
noted was relatively modest (Exp(β) 1.506). Perhaps not surprisingly, there appears to be a
strong and significant link between social trust and political trust (Exp(β) 3.092) which has
been observed in other studies (Hall, 1999). Nonetheless, even those attainers exhibiting
high levels of social trust have little faith in those who are charged with conducting politics
on their behalf.
Conc lus ion
In this article, we have presented evidence to suggest that young people are interested in
‘Politics’ and do have some faith in the democratic process. Nonetheless, it would appear
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that the political system and the established parties and politicians that dominate it, are
together failing to provide the stimuli necessary to encourage young people to engage
with politics. Consequently, they are becoming increasingly disenchanted with all that
the traditional political set-up has to offer.
We have also found that there is no uniform youth approach to politics in Britain –
this generation is diverse in its political outlook. Whilst there are minimal ethnicity effects,
there is some evidence of a gender gap when it comes to political attitudes. However, this
gender dimension has less influence than does social class or educational career. Those
from predominantly middle-class households appear to be much more committed to the
democratic process than are young people from broadly working-class backgrounds.
Whilst they too hold an antipathy towards the political parties and the professional
politicians, they are noticeably less sceptical than are their working-class contemporaries.
Education also has some influence on young people’s political outlook. Surprisingly,
those in possession of educational or work-related qualifications are less likely than those
without to feel that they have some influence over the political decision-making world,
and they are more hostile to the political parties and politicians. Perhaps the educational
capital that they have built up through studying for these qualifications has sensitised
them to the vagaries of the political system? Or it might be argued perhaps that those with
no qualifications are more likely to have left education, found employment, and started
earning – if so, this is likely to boost their sense of personal autonomy relative to those still
in education. However, our data suggest that those without educational or work-related
qualifications are only marginally more likely to be in paid work than are their qualified
peers. By way of contrast, the effect of remaining in the education system would appear to
exert significant influence – staying on in the education system has a clear and consistent
impact on attitudes to the democratic system and the dominant political actors.
Social capital has at best a mixed impact on political attitudes, and certainly this is
not more significant than are socio-economic differences. Those lacking in social capital
have less faith in the democratic process and its custodians than do their counterparts
who have relatively higher levels of social capital. But these differences are not strong.
Associational membership has only a negligible impact on political interest (although this
is not statistically significant). Social trust is only statistically significant in terms of its
impact on trust in political parties and professional politicians – nonetheless, all young
people are deeply sceptical of these key political players. There is no discernible impact
of social capital on either faith in the democratic process or feelings of political efficacy.
The overall direct influence of social capital as a driver of youth political disengagement
in Britain is therefore questionable, especially when compared with the impact of key
socio-economic variables such as social class and education.
These results suggest therefore that government social policy which addresses socio-
economic-related issues, educational policy, and the mobilisation of social capital may
have some impact on young people’s civic engagement. This is particularly pertinent given
that studies published elsewhere indicate that young people in particular are more likely
to experience greater levels of social exclusion and have less social capital than older
age groups. They are less trusting of others, and less well integrated within communities
with fewer social networks (Hall, 1999; Fahmy, 2004; Lowndes andWilson, 2001). Policy
which succeeds in expanding educational participation, reducing social class differences
and social exclusion, regenerating neighbourhoods and communities, strengthening local
community networks and promoting social cohesion, and fostering volunteering and
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self-help, may contribute in helping to at least limit the drift towards further political
disengagement amongst youth in Britain.
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Notes
1 However, see for instance Newton (1999a) who claims that the evidence from Britain is that the
links between social trust and political behaviour are relatively weak and contingent.
2 For a review of the debate, see Henn et al. (2005).
3 However, it should be noted that the evidence is at times contradictory, and dependent on how
social capital and political activity are measured. For instance, Pattie et al. (2004) claim that trust in other
people is positively related to election turnout (and significantly so), whilst associational membership (of
voluntary groups) discourages voting. However, elsewhere the same authors (Pattie et al., 2003) claim that
trust in others is negatively related (and significantly so) to other forms of civic activism – the contacting
of officials and collective action such as taking part in demonstrations.
4 One other model that has attained significant prominence in the study of political participation is
the rational choice model, which posits that, ‘individuals engage in political activity to pursue particular
goals, and they decide to participate when the benefits of such activity outweigh the costs’ (Leighley, 1995:
192). However, an examination of this model is beyond the scope of our survey data and therefore of this
article.
5 See research by Weinstein (2005) where it is argued that historically social science research has
employed a concept of ‘youth’ for the study of political attitudes and political behaviour that fails to
appreciate the varied experiences of young people that flow from their social class, gender, ethnicity and
other key socio-economic characteristics.
6 Of course, not every attainer may be captured by this method – indeed, approximately 15 per cent
of attainers are not registered to vote (Russell et al., 2002). Nonetheless, the vast majority of our target
group were eligible for inclusion.
7 This enabled respondents’ postcode locations to be ordered in such a way that they were spread
both socio-economically and also geographically in proportion to the number of households in each
standard region.
8 We also compared our sample composition with results from several large-scale national surveys
commonly used for this purpose in academic studies (Regional Trends, 2001, Vol.36; Annual Abstract
of Statistics, 2002, Vol. 138; The Labour Force Survey, 2001). Our unweighted survey results for gender,
social class and region/nationality broadly match the distributions reported across the country, indicating
that we can have confidence in the representativeness of our sample results.
9 In order to conduct the analyses these socio-economic variables were coded as binary variables.
The direction of the coding in each analysis is detailed in Table 1. For example in Table 1 in the ‘Interest’
model, ‘Sex’ is coded in terms of ‘Being male’ where a score of 0 indicates the respondent is female and
where 1 indicates the respondent is male. Therefore a positive relationship indicates that males are more
likely to show political engagement.
10 See for instance: Butler and Stokes (1974), Parry et al. (1992).
11 The Social trust variable is based on two questions. Firstly, respondents were asked whether they
considered that most people could be trusted, and, secondly, whether they felt that most people with
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whom they came into contact would try to take advantage of them or not. It is coded as a binary variable,
and the coding direction is detailed in Table 1 in the same way as the socio-economic variables.
12 This independent variable, Associational membership is based on two items taken from the
questionnaire–whether or not respondents had previously volunteered to get involved in local or
community affairs (like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club), and, if so, how active
they had been? It is coded as a binary variable with 1 representing some participation in voluntary activities
and 0 representing no such voluntary activity.
13 These dependent variables were developed from our research questions listed earlier. The first
dependent variable is Political engagement labelled as ‘Interest’ which combines two questions – whether
respondents had an interest in politics, and whether they were interested in the 2001 General Election
(coded as 1 interested/0 not interested). The second dependent variable is Support for the democratic
process labelled as ‘Democracy’ which is a single variable that compares those who are on the whole
satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country. The third dependent variable
is Political efficacy labelled as ‘Efficacy’ which combines whether they considered that being active in
politics is a good way to get help for themselves and their family, whether they disagree that it takes
too much time to be active in politics and public affairs, whether they disagree that young people like
themselves have no say in what the government does, whether they disagree that there aren’t enough
opportunities for young people like themselves to influence political parties, and also how much influence
they consider that they have on the decisions affecting them taken by politicians. This variable is coded
as 1 participation opportunities exist/0 no participation opportunities exist. The final dependent variable
is Perception of political parties and professional politicians which combines 14 questions concerning
whether they agree or disagree that: there is often a big difference between what a party promises it will
do and what it actually does when it wins an election; political parties are more interested in winning
elections that in governing afterwards; the main political parties in Britain don’t offer voters real choices
in elections because their policies are pretty much all the same; political parties do more to divide the
country than unite it; political parties spend too much time bickering with each other; parties generally
do a good job in finding suitable people to run for parliament; in elections, political parties don’t tell
people about the really important problems facing the country; it’s embarrassing when the parties try to
appeal to young people during election campaigns; political parties do a good job of listening to young
people’s concerns, and then responding to them positively; governments don’t really care what young
people like me think; those elected to parliament soon lose touch with people; parties are only interested
in people’s votes, not in their opinions; there aren’t enough opportunities for young people like me to
influence political parties; political parties aren’t interested in the same issues that concern young people.
This variable is coded 1 enthusiastic/0 not enthusiastic.
14 Tests of multicollinearity between the predictor variables were conducted in multiple regressions.
There was no significant multicollinearity between any of the predictors.
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